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Abstract
Concern over climate change has led the U.S. to consider a cap-and-trade system to regulate emissions. Here we illustrate
the land-use impact to U.S. habitat types of new energy development resulting from different U.S. energy policies. We
estimated the total new land area needed by 2030 to produce energy, under current law and under various cap-and-trade
policies, and then partitioned the area impacted among habitat types with geospatial data on the feasibility of production.
The land-use intensity of different energy production techniques varies over three orders of magnitude, from 1.9–2.8 km
2/
TW hr/yr for nuclear power to 788–1000 km
2/TW hr/yr for biodiesel from soy. In all scenarios, temperate deciduous forests
and temperate grasslands will be most impacted by future energy development, although the magnitude of impact by
wind, biomass, and coal to different habitat types is policy-specific. Regardless of the existence or structure of a cap-and-
trade bill, at least 206,000 km
2 will be impacted without substantial increases in energy efficiency, which saves at least
7.6 km
2 per TW hr of electricity conserved annually and 27.5 km
2 per TW hr of liquid fuels conserved annually. Climate
policy that reduces carbon dioxide emissions may increase the areal impact of energy, although the magnitude of this
potential side effect may be substantially mitigated by increases in energy efficiency. The possibility of widespread energy
sprawl increases the need for energy conservation, appropriate siting, sustainable production practices, and compensatory
mitigation offsets.
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Introduction
Climate change is now acknowledged as a potential threat to
biodiversity and human well-being, and many countries are seeking to
reduce their emissions by shifting from fossil fuels to other energy
sources. One potential side effect with this switch is the increase in area
required by some renewable energy production techniques [1–5].
Energy production techniques vary in the spatial extent in which
production activities occur, which we refer to as their energy sprawl
[2,3], defined as the product of the total quantity of energy produced
annually (e.g., TW hr/yr) and the land-use intensity of production (e.g.
km
2of habitat per TW hr/yr). While many studies have quantified the
likely effect of climate change on the Earth’s biodiversity due to
climate-driven habitat loss, concluding that a large proportion of
species could be driven extinct [6–8], relatively few studies have
evaluated the habitat impact of future energy sprawl. It is important to
understand the potential habitat effects of energy sprawl, especially in
reference to the loss of specific habitat types, since habitats vary
markedly in the species and ecosystem processes they support.
Within the United States, the world’s largest cumulative polluter
of greenhouse gases, concern over climate change has led to the
consideration of a cap-and-trade system to regulate emissions, such
as the previously proposed Lieberman-Warner Climate Security
Act (S. 2191) [9] and the Low Carbon Economy Act (S. 1766)
[10]. Major points of contention in structuring a cap-and-trade
system are the feasibility and desirability of carbon capture and
storage (CCS) at coal plants, the creation of new nuclear plants,
and whether to allow international offset programs that permit
U.S. companies to meet obligations abroad [11]. The rules of a
cap-and-trade system, as well as technological advances in energy
production and changes in the price of fossil fuels, will affect how
the U.S. generates energy. In this study we take scenarios of a cap-
and-trade system’s effect on United States energy production and
evaluate each scenario’s impact on habitat due to energy sprawl.
Our scenarios (Fig. 1A) are based on the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) forecast of energy production in 2030 [12]
under current law (the ‘‘Reference Scenario’’), including the
renewable fuel standard of the Energy Independence and Security
Act of 2007, and under three cap-and-trade scenarios: the ‘‘Core
Cap-and-Trade Scenario’’, where the full Lieberman-Warner
Climate Change Act is implemented; the ‘‘Few Options
Scenario’’, where international offsets are not allowed and where
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6802new nuclear production and coal production with CCS are not
possible; and the ‘‘CCS Scenario’’, where Congress enacts the
Low Carbon Economy Act, a cap-and-trade system more
favorable to coal with CCS.
Under each scenario, we first estimate the total new land area in
the U.S. needed to produce energy for each production technique
as a function of the amount of energy needed and the land-use
intensity of production. We examine the effect of U.S. climate
policy on future energy sprawl using energy scenarios based on
proposed legislation, building on a body of literature on this topic
[1,2,13–15]. Note that our analysis focuses only on U.S. land-use
implications, ignoring other, potentially significant international
land-use implications of U.S. climate policy. Second, we use
available information on where new energy production facilities
Figure 1. U.S. energy consumption and total new area impacted. (A) U.S. energy consumption in 2006 and under four EIA scenarios. Energy
conservation of liquid fuels and electricity, calculated relative to the Reference scenario, are shown as negative since they reduce consumption. (B)
The total new area impacted because of development between 2006 and 2030. The new area impacted, or energy sprawl, is a product of
consumption and the land-use intensity values in Figure 3. Energy conservation is calculated based on a scenario-specific weighted-average of the
energy mix.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006802.g001
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(Fig. 2). We calculate the new area directly impacted by energy
development within each major habitat type, but do not attempt to
predict where within each major habitat type energy development
will take place, nor possible indirect effects on land-use regionally
or globally due to altered land markets. Our analysis provides a
broad overview of what change in the energy sector will mean for
area impacted in different natural habitat types, recognizing that
such a broad analysis will inevitably have to simplify parts of a
complex world.
Results
Land-use intensity of energy production
The land-use intensity of different energy production techniques
(i.e., the inverse of power density [16,17]), as measured in km
2 of
impacted land in 2030 per terawatt-hour per year, varies over
three orders of magnitude (Fig. 3). Nuclear power (1.9–2.8 km
2/
TW hr/yr), coal (2.5–17.0 km
2/TW hr/yr) and geothermal (1.0–
13.9 km
2/TW hr/yr) are the most compact by this metric.
Conversely, biofuels (e.g., for corn ethanol 320–375 km
2/TW hr/
yr) and biomass burning of energy crops for electricity (433–
654 km
2/TW hr/yr) take the most space per unit power. Most
renewable energy production techniques, like wind and solar
power, have intermediate values of this metric.
Energy conservation can reduce overall energy consumption
thus reducing the area impacted by energy development. For
every TW hr decrease in annual electric power consumption, a
weighted-average of electricity use under the Reference scenario
suggests 7.6–28.7 km
2 of avoided impact. The corresponding
figure for liquid fuels (27.5–99.3 km
2 of avoided impact per TW
hr/yr) is higher because of the relatively large land-use intensity of
biofuels.
Our definition of impact varies among energy production
techniques, so a less compact way of generating energy does not
necessarily mean that an energy production technique is more
damaging to biodiversity, but simply that it has a larger spatial
area impacted to some degree. Moreover, many energy produc-
tion techniques actually have multiple effects on biodiversity,
which operate at different spatial and temporal scales. Biodiversity
impacts that are likely to scale with areal impact include habitat
replacement and habitat fragmentation. Energy production
impacts on biodiversity not related to land use intensity include
impacts on air quality (e.g. acid rain, particulates), water quality
Figure 2. Major habitat types used to analyze the land-use implications of EIA scenarios. Within each major habitat type, there are a
variety of land-uses, from relatively wild places to agricultural and urban systems. Our analysis estimates the new area needed for energy
development within each major habitat type, without specifying where within each major habitat type this energy development might occur.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006802.g002
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water, evaporation from hydroelectric reservoirs), and water flows
(e.g. dam-based hydroelectric). Further, the longevity of the
impacts described here varies. For example, radioactive nuclear
waste will last for millennia, some mine tailings will be toxic for
centuries, and other mines may be reclaimed for agriculture within
decades.
A full discussion of the impacts on biodiversity of energy
production is beyond the scope of this paper, but one fundamental
distinction is worth making. Some energy production techniques
clear essentially all natural habitat within their area of impact. A
review of the literature (see citations below and in Supplementary
Text S1) found this to be true for coal, nuclear, solar, and
hydropower, as well as for the growth of energy crops for biofuels
or for burning for electricity. Energy crop production is a
particularly complex situation because even if new energy crop
production occurs on land that was previously in agricultural
production, remaining global demand for agricultural commod-
ities may spur indirect effects on land-use elsewhere, potentially
causing an agricultural expansion in areas far from the location of
energy crop production [18]. Other energy production techniques
have a relatively small infrastructure footprint and a larger area
impacted by habitat fragmentation and other secondary effects on
wildlife. A review of the literature found that production
techniques that involve wells like geothermal, natural gas, and
petroleum have about 5% of their impact area affected by direct
clearing while 95% of their impact area is from fragmenting
habitats and species avoidance behavior. Wind turbines have a
similar figure of about 3–5% of their impact area affected by direct
clearing while 95–97% of their impact area is from fragmenting
habitats, species avoidance behavior, and issues of bird and bat
mortality.
Energy sprawl in 2030
Regardless of climate change policy, the total new area affected
by energy production techniques by 2030 exceeds 206,000 km
2 in
all scenarios (Fig. 1B), an area larger than the state of Nebraska.
Biofuels have the greatest cumulative areal impact of any energy
production technique, despite providing less than 5% of the U.S.
total energy under all scenarios. Biofuel production, and hence
new area impacted, is similar among scenarios because EIA’s
economic model suggests that, under current law, incentives for
biofuel production cause expansion of this energy production
technique regardless of climate policy.
Nevertheless, in the scenarios we considered there is a tendency
for greater reductions in greenhouse gas emissions to be associated
with a greater total new area affected by energy development,
particularly under the Core Cap-and-Trade and Few Options
Scenario (Figure 4). A decrease in U.S. emissions increases the new
area impacted, although the magnitude of the effect is policy
Figure 3. Land-use intensity for energy production/conservation techniques. Value shown is for 2030, as measured in km
2 of impacted
area in 2030 per terawatt-hour produced/conserved in that year. Error bars show the most-compact and least-compact estimates of plausible current
and future levels of land-use intensity. Numbers provided are the midpoint between the high and low estimates for different techniques. For liquid
fuels, energy loss from internal combustion engines is not included in this calculation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006802.g003
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energy crops for electricity becomes profitable after the price of
electricity rises due to the cap-and-trade system, resulting in a
large new areal impact. Similarly, wind power is very important in
the Few Options scenario, where new electric production from
coal and nuclear is not an option, and causes a large new areal
impact. Conversely, in scenarios where there is not control on
carbon emissions (Reference Scenario) or in cases where CCS is
viable (e.g., CCS Scenario), coal production has a large new areal
impact. The infrastructure for CCS is actually a small fraction of
the area impacted by coal mining itself, so the major land-use
change implication of the viability of coal with CCS is the
continuation of coal mining (Supplementary Data S1).
Our results stress the importance of energy conservation for
reducing energy sprawl. Relative to the Reference scenario, all
cap-and-trade scenarios involve a reduction in energy consumed
(Fig. 1B), because of energy efficiency and foregone consumption
due to higher energy prices. This energy conservation is primarily
in the electricity market, which is more elastic than demand for
liquid fuels. Electricity conservation avoids impacts on at least
49,600 km
2 in the Core Cap-and-Trade scenario, while at least
2,500 km
2 will be saved due to liquid fuel conservation, compared
to the Reference scenario. EIA assumptions about the potential for
energy conservation are relatively modest [19] and some groups
argue that energy conservation has greater potential [20].
Habitat impacts
The major terrestrial habitat types (Fig. 2) impacted domesti-
cally by energy development varied among energy production
technique (Table 1). Regardless of scenario, the major habitat
types with the most new area affected, summing over all energy
production techniques, are Temperate Deciduous Forests and
Temperate Grasslands (Supplementary Data S2). In the Reference
scenario, Temperate Deciduous Forests have between 95,000 km
2
(most compact estimate) and 229,000 km
2 (least compact estimate)
impacted, while Temperate Grasslands have 65,000–168,000 km
2
impacted. In the Core Cap-and-Trade scenario these types have
119,000–254,000 km
2 and 88,000–191,000 km
2 impacted, re-
spectively. Patterns of total new areal impacts are driven by biofuel
production, which peaks in these two habitat types. Biomass
burning for electricity and coal mining are also concentrated in
Temperate Deciduous Forests and Temperate Grasslands. Wind
production onshore is likely to affect Temperate Conifer Forests
and Temperate Grasslands in the western U.S. disproportionately.
The least impacted habitats are: Tundra; Boreal Forest; Tropical
Dry Forests; Flooded Grasslands; and Tropical Moist Forests. All
of these habitat types have less than 150 km
2 impacted by energy
development in the Reference Scenario and less than 600 km
2
impacted by energy development in the Core Cap-and-Trade
Scenario, using the minimal sprawl estimates from Figure 3.
Figure 4. Greenhouse gas emissions and total new area
impacted with a cap-and-trade system. Arrows depict the
difference between the Reference Scenario, with no cap-and-trade
system, and three other scenarios where a cap-and-trade system is
implemented. Greenhouse gas emissions measured in million tonnes of
carbon dioxide equivalent.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006802.g004
Table 1. Minimum new area (km
2) of habitat types impacted in the U.S.
Habitat Type Coal Biomass Biofuels Wind
Boreal Forests 94 (227) 2 (+12) 3 (+0) 6 (+9)
Deserts 2,310 (2662) 257 (+1244) 372 (+14) 884 (+1,300)
Flooded Grasslands 0 (0) 30 (+143) 41 (+1) 0 (0)
Mediterranean Habitat 5 (21) 123 (+596) 1,699 (+37) 54 (+79)
Temperate Conifer Forests 4,936 (21,413) 1,883 (+9,106) 12,977 (+739) 2,835 (+4,169)
Temperate Deciduous Forests 10,297 (22,945) 4,014 (+19,415) 76,841 (+6,751) 428 (+630)
Temperate Grasslands 7,508 (22,147) 3,760 (+18,185) 46,821 (+4,136) 1,392 (+2,047)
Tropical Dry Forests 0 (0) 4 (+18) 5 (0) 34 (+50)
Tropical Grasslands 1,304 (2373) 59 (+284) 1,583 (+65) 3 (+5)
Tropical Moist Forests 0 (0) 7 (+32) 9 (0) 78 (+115)
Tundra 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0)
Data are from the Reference Scenario for four major types of energy development: coal production, biomass burning for electricity, biofuel production, and wind power.
Energy development is partitioned among habitat types, as depicted in Figure 2. Numbers in parentheses are the change in value under the Core Cap-and-Trade
Scenario. For example, boreal forests have 94 km
2 affected under the Reference Scenario by coal, but have 27 fewer km
2 affected by coal under the Core Cap-and-Trade
Scenario (i.e., 67 km
2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006802.t001
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varied among scenarios for certain energy production techniques.
For example, scenarios where continued coal power generation is
viable, either because of no restrictions on carbon emissions
(Reference scenario) or because CCS is viable (e.g., CCS scenario)
have greater impacts on those major habitat types with major coal
seams (e.g., Temperate Deciduous Forests). Conversely, scenarios
where coal power generation is less viable have greater production
from wind, affecting specific habitat types where those production
techniques are favorable (e.g., Temperate Conifer Forests).
Climate policy thus controls the extent to which specific habitat
types are at risk from new energy development.
Discussion
Our analyses show that, regardless of scenario, at least
206,000 km2 of new land will be required to meet U.S. energy
demand by 2030. Further, implementing a cap-and-trade system
may increase the total new area impacted by energy development
and change its distribution among habitat types, relative to the
Reference scenario. Energy production will shift from fossil fuels to
energy production techniques that draw more diffuse energy from
a broader spatial area. Note that because the EIA analysis assumes
that the energy market responds to price signals and does not
explicitly attempt to minimize land-use per se, it is theoretically
possible that there are other, more expensive mixes of energy
production that would satisfy U.S. energy needs in 2030 but would
take less space. Although policies that reduce carbon emissions
with minimal new land use are possible, none of the different
policy EIA scenarios we considered were designed with that goal
in mind. As shown by Wise et al. [21], if there were financial
incentives to minimize land-use in energy production like a tax on
greenhouse gas emissions from land-use change, the energy market
response to a cap-and-trade might be very different from the
response depicted in the EIA scenarios.
There are at least four ways to achieve emissions reduction but
avoid the potential side effect of energy sprawl. First, energy
conservation can help reduce the new energy needed by the U.S.,
reducing the area impacted by new energy development. Second,
because end-use generation of electricity often occurs on already
developed sites, it has minimal habitat impacts, and policy
instruments that encourage end-use generation can also decrease
the total area impacted. Third, our results suggest that energy
sprawl is less severe when the cap-and-trade bill is more flexible,
allowing for CCS, new nuclear plants, and international offsets.
Fourth, many areal impacts can be mitigated or eliminated with
appropriate site selection and planning for energy development.
The new area affected by energy development within each major
habitat type might, for example, have minimal biodiversity effects
if sited in already disturbed places.
The areal impacts on habitat types will vary among scenarios,
along with the potential biodiversity impacts of U.S. climate
policy. While not all impacts on biodiversity are strictly related to
the areal impact, it is likely that energy production techniques with
a large areal impact will have a relatively large biodiversity impact.
Thus, the details of climate change policy, by favoring particular
energy production techniques, pick biodiversity winners and
losers. For instance, the Few Options Scenario assumes that
international offsets, actions taken abroad to prevent carbon
emissions or sequester more carbon, are not allowed under a cap-
and-trade regime. The major response forecasted by EIA is an
increase in wind production domestically relative to the Reference
Scenario, affecting especially Temperate Conifer Forests and
Temperate Grasslands. This increase in wind production may be
compatible with biodiversity if properly sited, but certainly will
pose a challenge for conservationists, because of the large area
impacted and the threat of bird and bat mortality [22]. On the
other hand, the biodiversity impacts of international offsets are
beyond the scope of this paper, but could conceivably be negligible
(e.g., scrubber on Chinese coal plant smokestacks), negative (e.g.,
replacing natural grasslands with plantation forests), or positive
(e.g., reducing emissions from degradation or deforestation).
Regardless of whether or not a cap-and-trade system is
implemented, the EIA analysis forecasts that biofuels will increase
dramatically in importance, with large areal impacts. In the
Reference scenario 141,000–247,000 km
2 will be impacted by
biofuels. Within the United States much energy crop production
will occur on grassland or forest sites already in use for agricultural
production, although increased aggregate demand for agricultural
commodities may still spur agricultural expansion domestically or
internationally (i.e., indirect land-use effects). In part, the large
increase in biofuels forecasted by EIA simply reflects their
assumption that current law, including the renewable fuel standard
defined by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, is
maintained to 2030. In part it also reflects the inelasticity of the
market for liquid fuels, relative to the electricity market, and the
likely high cost of petroleum over the long-term [23]. It seems
likely that under current law there will be a large areal impact
from biofuels regardless of the cap-and-trade system put in place.
Given the high land-use intensity of biofuels, techniques for either
increasing the efficiency of biofuel production or making sites of
energy crop production more biodiversity-friendly should be a
high priority for research.
Our results demonstrate that, under certain policy scenarios,
one potential side effect of reducing emissions is an increase in
habitat impacts. The impact of a cap-and-trade system will be less,
however, than from biofuel production already mandated by
current law. Aggressive energy conservation, appropriate siting,
sustainable production practices, and reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions will all be necessary to minimize the impact of future
energy use on habitat and wildlife. Energy sprawl deserves to be
one of the metrics by which energy production is assessed.
Materials and Methods
Our analysis proceeded in two phases. First, we calculated the
new land area of energy development necessary to meet the EIA
scenarios. Not all biodiversity impacts are directly related to the
amount of land taken up by a technology, but it is likely that an
energy production technique that takes a lot of land will have a
relatively large biodiversity impact, so the total new area impact is
a useful quantity to measure. Second, we partitioned this new land
area among different geographic regions. We focused on domestic
impacts for this analysis, ignoring the future habitat impacts of
foreign-produced energy, principally future oil imports from
Canada, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as future
ethanol imports from Brazilian sugarcane plantations. Similarly,
we focused on terrestrial impacts for this analysis, ignoring
potential freshwater or marine impacts by hydropower, wind,
oil, and natural gas development in U.S. waters. Finally, we are
calculating direct land-use (how much land will we need to
produce energy?), and did not attempt to estimate secondary
changes in the land market in response to the direct land-use.
Scenarios
Our analysis is based on the EIA’s 2008 scenarios of energy
markets and the economy [12]. These scenarios were calculated by
EIA’s National Energy Modeling System, a comprehensive
Climate Policy and Habitat
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6802econometric model of U.S. energy production, imports, and
consumption. The scenarios supply information on the amount of
additional energy consumed in 2030 in a particular sector (e.g.,
million barrels per day of petroleum, billion KW hr of new
generation capacity by solar power). We use four scenarios in our
analysis. A Reference scenario describes what will likely happen in
U.S. energy markets under laws in force as of April 2008. The
Core Cap-and-Trade scenario forecasts the effect of the full
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 2191), which
regulates emissions of greenhouse gases through a cap-and-trade
system and provides economic incentives for increased energy
efficiency [24]. One variant of S. 2191 is considered, the Few
Options scenario, where the use of international offsets in
greenhouse gas emissions is either not economically feasible or is
severely limited by regulation and where there is no increase in
nuclear, coal with CCS, and imports of liquefied natural gas over
current levels (the EIA called this the ‘‘Limited Alternatives/No
International Offsets case’’). Finally, the CCS scenario forecasts
the effect of the Low Carbon Economy Act (S. 1766), which also
sets up a cap-and-trade system for greenhouse gases but offers
strong incentives for the development and deployment of CCS
[25]. Overall energy consumption by each sector for each scenario
is shown in Figure 1A.
Four things about the scenarios are worth noting. First, other
scenarios of the likely effect of S. 2191 [11,24] are available from
other groups, although they are broadly similar to the EIA
analysis. Second, all scenarios of the effect of a cap-and-trade bill
are tentative due to uncertainty about the pace of technological
change, among other things. Thus, the EIA scenarios we use in
this analysis must be taken as indicative of future trends, but not
definitive [24]. Third, the EIA scenarios model the likely response
of the U.S. energy sector in response to a set of policy assumptions,
and do not consider land-use per se. The EIA scenarios predict the
most likely response, and do not attempt to find a more expensive
energy mix that would minimize the total land-use. Finally, U.S.
energy policy has changed rapidly since the EIA’s 2008 analysis,
which still is the most current available full analysis of a cap-and-
trade bill. The Warner-Lieberman bill is no longer considered an
active bill, and most activity in Congress has focused on the
Waxman-Markey bill (H.R. 2454), which proposes a very similar
cap-and-trade system. Additionally, the passage of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Bill of 2009 (i.e., the stimulus bill) has
provided significant support to renewable energy producers,
particularly wind producers. Thus, the Reference Case discussed
in this manuscript may underestimate the amount of renewable
energy production in that case. Despite these changes in U.S.
climate policy since the EIA’s 2008 analysis, the broad results of
our analysis will likely apply to any similar cap-and-trade system.
Calculating area requirements
Our general strategy was to estimate reasonable most-compact
and least-compact values of the amount of area needed to produce
a certain amount of energy in a year, the land-use intensity of
production. We then multiplied the needed energy by our
measurement of land-use intensity of production (km
2/energy/
year) to obtain the ‘‘energy sprawl,’’ the total new area needed for
new energy production in that sector. Calculation of land-use
intensity in this manner is useful for the goals of our analysis,
allowing calculation of the total new area impacted by energy
development. It is similar to the measurement of ‘‘area efficiency’’
[26], in that it does not attempt to account for site preparation
prior to energy production nor potential site reclamation after
production has ceased, which are sometimes considered in a full
life-cycle analysis [3]. Ecologically, over the time period of our
study few sites will be reclaimed to vegetation approaching their
original habitat value [27]. Numerically, our land-use intensity
values represent a lower estimate because they do not include
land-use during site preparation or reclamation. While our
methodology does not allow a full statistical analysis of the
uncertainty of our estimates, the variation between the least
compact and most compact estimates of land-use intensity
captures most of the uncertainty.
Estimating areal impacts of new methods of electricity
generation is relatively straightforward. The EIA forecasts new
power generating capacity needed (billion KW), after accounting
for likely retirement of existing generation capacity and the
nameplate capacity factors of different energy production
techniques. We used values from the literature to calculate the
km
2 of impact per GW of new generating capacity (see Tables 1, 2,
and Supplementary Text S1). Our approach ignores the
importation of electricity from Canada or Mexico, on the grounds
that this is predicted by the EIA to remain a minor component of
total electricity generation. End-use generation of electricity,
which is tracked separately for the EIA for several sectors, is
considered to have negligible area requirements, since it by
definition occurs on previously developed sites. Similarly, the
energy efficiency increases in the EIA scenarios are considered to
have negligible area requirements, since they occur through
upgrades in existing building and infrastructure. We have not
Table 2. Land-use intensity of production for coal mining.
Geographic
region
Proportion
surface mining
Most compact
ha/mmt
Least Compact
ha/mmt Notes
Appalachia U.S. 0.352 11.6 pit, 79.1 surface 115.7 pit, 791.4 surface Proportion of surface mining from EIA’s 2006 Coal production in
the United states fact sheet (uses 2003 data). Surface coal yields
most compact figure based on Spitzley and Keoleian [3], least
compact figure on Flattop mine has 2.3 million tons of coal on 600
acres. Pit mining assumed 10% of area as surface mining.
Interior U.S. 0.643 11.6 pit, 79.1 surface 115.7 pit, 791.4 surface As above
Western U.S. 0.898 11.6 pit, 79.1 surface 115.7 pit, 791.4 surface As above
Import 0.671 11.6 pit, 79.1 surface 115.7 pit, 791.4 surface Proportion surface mining assumed to be same as overall U.S.
average.
For each geographic region of coal, we show the proportion of the coal that is from surface mines versus pit mines, as well as least-compact and most-compact
estimates of the area requirements of coal mining, in hectares per million metric tonnes of coal. Impact for coal mines is defined as the area directly surrounding the
mine site.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006802.t002
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transmission lines needed to carry new capacity, as the length and
location of new lines is very uncertain and depends on future
energy production mixes as well as federal and state policy.
Our estimates of land-use intensity of production are shown in
Table S1 and Supplementary Text S1. Our large-area estimates are
generally from current operating plants, whereas our small-area
estimates represent expert opinion about expected future techno-
logical advances in efficiency. The definition of impact implied by
these estimates was designed to match the majority of published
studies of the severity of impact on biodiversity, and thus varies
slightly among energy technologies. For example, for hydropower
we have assumed that new dam construction inundates an area of
terrestrial habitat,removing itofmost ofitsnative biodiversity.Note
alsothat the differentcategories of electricitygenerationderive from
the EIA report. For instance, the EIA chose to recognize solar
photovoltaic and electricity from solar thermal as two different
energy production techniques, and we follow their convention in
our analysis. The EIA partitioned solar photovoltaic use between
end-users, assumed to have negligible land-use implications in our
analysis, and large-scale generation, which does have significant
areal implications. We track end-use and large-scale generation
separately in this and other cases, following EIA’s methodology.
The EIA forecasts biofuel (ethanol, biodiesel, and other liquids
from biomass) production and total use, with the vast majority of
use being ethanol in transportation. Moreover, they estimate the
proportion of domestic ethanol production from corn, cellulose,
and other feedstocks, as well as net imports of ethanol and
biodiesel. For each type of biofuel and its feedstock, we estimated
least compact and most compact estimates of the number of m
2 of
feedstock cropland per liter of biofuel (Table S2 and Supplemen-
tary Text S1). In general, least compact estimates are for current
agricultural yields (kg/m
2) and biofuel production efficiencies (L/
kg), while most compact estimates are a product of future
agricultural yields and biofuel production efficiencies. For some
crops like soy, the difference in least compact and most compact
estimates is primarily due to a predicted increase in yield, while for
other biofuels like cellulosic ethanol the difference is largely due to
differences in biofuel production efficiency.
For many biofuels, farmers also make a portion of their income
from coproducts, portions of the crop that are not used to make
biofuels but have another economic market. We use a market-value
allocation approach, defining the actual increase in production area
of a crop as a function of the fraction of the economic value of the
crop that is embodied in the biofuel [28]. Note that our
methodology tracks the direct land-use needs of biofuel production,
and does not consider indirect effects on land-use via agricultural
commodity markets. For example, if a soy field in the U.S. is
switched to corn to make ethanol, than soy production will likely
expand elsewhere either domestically or internationally. A full
accounting of the demand and supply curves of the various
agricultural crops, biofuels, and their coproducts is beyond the
scope of this project, but is an active area of research [18,29-31].
Estimating the areal impact of fossil fuels was done in an
analogous manner. EIA analyses divided domestic coal production
into three geographic regions (Appalachia, Interior, and West). We
separated the coal produced in each region into the proportion
mined underground and the proportion mined at the surface,
using EIA’s factsheet on coal production in the United States.
Then, using data on the amount of coal removed per unit area, we
calculated area impacted (Table 2). For this analysis, we ignore the
relatively small areal impact of coal burning power plants, which
comprise a small fraction of the areal impact of coal mining.
For oil production, the EIA estimated imports as well as
domestic production from three geographic regions: the land
surface of the contiguous 48 United States (lower 48 onshore);
water bodies in or close to the contiguous 48 United States (lower
48 offshore) and the state of Alaska. Note that because EIA
assumes existing law will continue, including the ban on new oil
drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Alaska oil
production actually falls slightly under all scenarios. Based on
historical data from the United States Geological Survey (USGS),
we estimated the proportion of oil production that is from oil wells
(as opposed to incidental production from gas wells) and the
average number of barrels per day per development well (Table 3).
We also estimated the number of development wells that are
abandoned per year. Using these data, we calculated the number
of new development wells needed to maintain current production
and the number of wells needed to achieve any production
increase forecasted by the EIA. By using this approach we are
accounting for the tendency of older wells to fall in production
over time and be abandoned, necessitating new wells just to
maintain current production levels.
For natural gas production the EIA provides one aggregate
domestic production figure, but does differentiate between pipeline
natural gas imports, which are predicted to decline, and liquefied
natural gas imports, which are predicted to increase. Following a
similar approach to the petroleum case, we estimated the
proportion of gas production that is from gas wells (as opposed
to incidental production from oil wells) and the average annual
thousand cubic feet per well (Table 3). Methodology generally
followed that used for oil wells.
The EIA provides explicit estimates of the emissions avoided
(million metric tons of CO2 equivalent) by the use of CCS
Table 3. Land-use intensity of oil and natural gas production.
Natural
Resource
Proportion
from well type Average production
Most compact
(ha/well)
Least Compact
(ha/well) Notes
Oil 0.862 from oil wells for
onshore production in
lower 48, 0.636 for Alaska.
1.14 m
3/day of crude from
lower 48 onshore, 56.13 m
3/day
of crude from Alaska onshore.
5.67 32.38 See text for estimation of trends in oil
production. Pinedale Anticline spacing is taken
as most-compact estimate and Jonah field
spacing as least-compact estimate.
Natural Gas 0.948 from natural gas
wells for U.S. onshore.
2,821 m
3/day of dry natural gas
from U.S. onshore.
5.67 32.38 As above.
For each geographic region (lower 48 onshore, lower 48 offshore, and Alaska), we used estimates of the proportion of the resource that is withdrawn from each type of
well and average well productivity, as well as least-compact and most-compact estimates of the area affected by each well, in hectares per well. Impact for wells is
defined as both the well area and the surrounding habitat fragmented by wells, access roads, and other structures. See text for details on impact calculations of oil and
gas pipelines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006802.t003
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generation (petroleum, natural gas, and coal). Because of the EIA
assumptions about the cost-effectiveness of implementation of CCS
and the incentive structures in S. 2191 and S. 1766, power plants
burning petroleum for electricity do not generally implement CCS,
whereaspowerplantsburningnaturalgasorcoaldowheneverthere
is a carbon cap in place (i.e., not the Reference scenario) and when
the CCS technology is available (i.e., not the Few Options case).
For new petroleum and natural gas production, we estimated the
amount of new pipeline needed, based on current ratios of
kilometers of pipeline to wells, assuming that these ratios held
constant into the future (0.9 km/well for oil production, 1.3 km/
well for gas production). For CCS, we also estimated the new
pipelines needed to move CCS (0.5 km/well): the length of new
pipeline per CCS injection site is likely to be more limited than in
the petroleum or natural gas case because CO2 has little economic
value [32].Forallpipelines,we then estimatedthearea impacted on
either side of the pipe (most-compact estimate 0.3 ha/km of pipe,
least-compact estimate 1.8 ha/km of pipe, based on common right
ofwaysofpipelines).Byestimating thearea impactedbypipelinesin
this way, we are assuming that the process of pipeline construction
removes most native biodiversity, and that any revegetation after
pipeline construction will have minimal biodiversity value.
A literature review revealed that many energy production
techniques actually have multiple effects on biodiversity, which
operate at different spatial and temporal scales. A full discussion of
the impacts on biodiversity of energy production is beyond the
scope of this paper, but we recorded quantitative data on the
proportion of our defined impact zone that was directly affected by
land clearing, as opposed to more diffuse processes such as habitat
fragmentation and organism avoidance behavior. Studies with
useful quantitative or semi-quantitative data on this topic include:
Coal [33], Nuclear [34–37], Solar [38,39], Hydroelectric [40,41],
Biofuels [5,18,28–31,42], Geothermal [43], Natural Gas and
Petroleum drilling [44,45], and Wind [22,46–51].
Where energy development occurs
The goal of this phase of the analysis was to partition the total
area of new energy development among geographic regions. We
ignored energy production techniques that had no significant
cumulative areal impact as calculated above (i.e., end-use power
generation, energy efficiency gains). For our regionalization
analysis, we chose definitions of geographic regions that have
maximal relevance to biodiversity yet are coarse-scaled enough to
average over errors and uncertainty in more fine-scaled input data
on energy resource availability and demand. For terrestrial
impacts we used the 11 major habitat types of the United States,
as defined by Nature Conservancy ecoregions [52–54]. For each
major habitat type, we estimate the total area of new energy
development, without attempting to specify where within each
major habitat type development will take place. Within each major
habitat type, there are a variety of land-uses, from relatively wild
places to agricultural and urban systems. Thus specific siting
decisions, while outside the scope of our analysis, will be important
in determining actual biodiversity impact.
Throughout our analysis, we excluded certain areas as being
protected or restricted from development, modeling our decision
rules on those used in the Department of Energy’s report ‘‘20%
Wind Energy by 2030 [47].’’ We excluded areas that were
protected areas with a Gap Analysis Program code of 1 or 2 (i.e.,
permanent protection excluding development), based on the
Protected Area Database of the United States, version 4[55].
We also excluded airports, urban areas, and wetlands/water
bodies from development, based on vector layers included with
Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI) ArcGIS
package. Areas with an average slope greater than 20% were also
excluded, based on a surface analysis of the GTOPO global digital
elevation model [56]. Finally, for wind power we assumed that
areas within 3 km of an airfield or urban area were not
developable.
For each energy production technique, we partitioned its land
use among regions in one of two methods. For some energy
production techniques, continuous (i.e., interval or ratio scale)
estimates of the supply of that resource were available for different
geographic regions (Table S3 and Supplementary Text S1). For
example, the Department of Energy publishes a continuous
estimate of the water power potential in MW of the different
hydrologic regions of the United States [57]. In these cases with
continuous estimates of resource supply, we assumed that the area
of energy development in each geographic region was propor-
tional to the total supply in that region. For some resources, the
geographic units in which data was available did not match those
of our analysis units, and we used geographic information system
(GIS) analyses to partition the resource among habitat types,
making the simplifying assumption that the resource was evenly
distributed within the original geographical units of the data. To
give an example from one particularly dataset, potential biomass
estimates were available from the National Renewable Energy
Laboratories (NREL), summarized per county [58]. We calculated
tonnes/km
2 for each county, digitized the data to a 1 km raster
resolution of the United States, and then used ESRI ArcGIS
ZonalStatistics commands to sum up the total available biomass in
each of our major habitat types.
Other energy production technologies had data on the supply of
the resource that were categorical (i.e., ordinal scale). For example,
NREL wind power maps rank sites on a scale of 1 to 7, based on the
quantity of wind available as well as its consistency. In these cases
with categorical data, we reclassified the U.S. into Excellent, Good,
and Poor regions for development of that energy resource. In some
cases a continuous estimate of a proxy for a resource was available
rather than a direct estimate of power availability, and in these cases
we classified the resource into categorical categories based on
published opinion about what sites were developable. While our
decision rules are admittedly arbitrary, they are derived from
common GIS analysis for site selection in the energy industry, and
we believe any reasonable set of decision rules would provide
qualitatively similar results. In general, we looked at both the supply
of a particular resource (e.g., how much sunlight is there?) and the
demand (e.g., how far away is the nearest electric transmission line
to carry the power to market?). The specific criteria we use are listed
in Table S3. We then calculated how much of each geographic
region was in the three categories (Excellent, Good, and Poor) using
ESRI ArcGIS ZonalStatistics commands. Next, we assumed that
the area of energy development in each geographic region was
proportional to the area classified as Excellent in that region. If all
areas categorized as Excellent were developed without meeting the
total areal target, the remaining development was assumed to ‘‘spill-
over’’ to the Good category, where it was similarly divided among
geographic regions.
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